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Abstract Much has been written about bystander apathy, which occurs when an
outsider (i.e., the bystander) is hesitant to act during a situation that clearly calls for
action. However, what about when the individual called to act is an insider? This
article asserts that insiders (i.e., players, or organizational actors) exhibit similar
passive behaviors but not because they are apathetic. Players who are internal to the
organization and are often responsible for the outcome are expected to act. Rather,
when confounded by ambiguous situations, obfuscated communications, time pressure, and confusion, players often stand by befuddled. This article surveys two such
cases. First is the recent case of Joe Paterno, the famed and beloved Penn State
football coach of 62 years whose otherwise remarkable career was tainted by his
failure to adequately act following a child abuse allegation of a staff member. Second
is the case of the Vancouver Olympic Committee and the death of a young athlete on
their newly built luge run. Those responsible failed to act when the danger of the
track’s extreme speeds were well known. The article compares the two cases and
concludes by proposing remedies to mitigate inaction.
# 2013 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All
rights reserved.

1. What are we thinking?
What are we thinking? Sometimes, we’re not; we’re
reacting instead. Sometimes, we are victims of our
own evolutionary success and fixed-action patterns
that have kept us safe (Cialdini, 2009). In modern
society, these behaviors still prevail. Many of us
fear snakes–—a behavior that saved the lives of our
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ancestors. Similarly, we are inclined to stay away
from trouble. These heuristics help us get safely
through our days without requiring complicated analysis and deep thought for each situation, but sometimes, we need to involve ourselves in troublesome
situations for the sake of humanity, overriding our
natural instincts. The applications for more effective
behavior in crisis situations are widespread. In war
zones, natural disasters, accidents, and even sports,
effective crisis management happens one person
at a time. The actions of a single person or many
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individuals working together can have enormous effects on outcomes. This article examines such responses to extreme situations.
Stunned, shocked, scared, and confused, human
beings often act like the proverbial deer frozen in
the headlights when presented with a troublesome
and unprecedented situation. Organizational actors, who are often a very important part of systems
potentially going foul, often stand by in confusion or
with the assumption that with so many people
around, someone must be doing something. These
can include situations with outcomes having devastating effects, such as loss of life. For the organizational actor, speaking up or acting in any way out of
the norm could be risky behavior, placing the actor
as well as his/her reputation, job, and livelihood in
jeopardy. In the midst of confusion, people are
hesitant to stand out for fear of potentially making
an embarrassing mistake or looking foolish in front
of others. According to the theory of social proof,
people take cues from others and follow suit
(Cialdini, 2009). There is no strong evidence suggesting people are apathetic; it just appears that
way. Some studies have suggested a diffusion of
accountability causes people to react with ambivalence, especially if the situation is ill defined
(Darley & Latané, 1968).

1.1. Bystanders, players, and stages of
inaction
The distinction between bystander apathy and player inaction requires clarification. A bystander is a
person uninvolved with or outside an organization or
situation. A player is a person involved with or inside
an organization or situation. Apathy is not caring,
while inaction is simply not acting. Let’s look at a
specific and well-known case and then examine the
problems of passivity.

2. Joe Paterno
By most measures, the late Joe Paterno was an
extraordinary person as his career and personal
successes remain unparalleled. With a total of
62 years’ coaching at Penn State, and 45 years as
head coach, Paterno had a remarkable football
career. Not the typical path for someone with an
English literature degree from an Ivy League college, the famous football coach was also a supporter
of intellectual endeavors and higher education.
When Paterno arrived at Penn State in 1950 as an
assistant coach, the Nittany Lions football team was
hardly a top contender. Since taking the head coaching position in 1966, Paterno led them to 37 bowl
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games and was named the winningest Division I
coach in the history of the sport with 409 victories
under his belt (Carey, 2012).
His players, friends, fans, and family adored him.
He was married to Suzanne [née] Pohland, and they
spent 50 years together. They raised five children, all
Penn State graduates, and enjoyed the love of
17 grandchildren. During his tenure at Penn State,
Paterno turned down several substantially more lucrative offers to coach professional football. He liked
to reminisce about his father’s words: that money is
needed to live, but too much is simply unnecessary.
His coaching style blended academics, athletics, and
ethics. His philosophy bled into campus life, and he
was considered a positive force throughout the enormous campus. His family donated millions of dollars
to Penn State, and the Paterno Library has stood as a
symbol of his commitment and generosity. He was
affectionately nicknamed JoePa and was an endeared and beloved figure on the Penn State campus.
People who knew Joe well remarked that he was
adored and outspoken but not perfect or saintly. As
with many successful coaches, Paterno was intense
and was known to shout at his players and others. His
outspoken nature and passion to improve his team
and moreover Penn State often offended others.
Friction with the university over the punishment
of players who broke school rules was not uncommon. As a coach, he got much satisfaction out of
rehabilitating players who needed guidance. He was
a man of many interests who believed strongly in a
well-rounded education and liked the challenge of
helping an athlete who was having trouble academically or otherwise. He was always anxious to support such athletes even if he had to clash with
university officials.
In October 2011, one of Paterno’s former assistant coaches, Jerry Sandusky, came under fire for
some 50 counts of sexual assault against eight boys
over a 15-year period. Sandusky left Penn State in
1999 after Paterno told him that his chances for
advancement were nil. After investigations, it was
discovered that in 2002, Paterno was made aware of
one of these alleged attacks by a member of his
staff, Mike McQueary, then an assistant coach
(Everson, 2012). McQueary reported that he witnessed Mr. Sandusky’s suspicious behavior in the
football facilities. In 2002, Sandusky was three years
gone from Paterno’s staff, but Paterno reported
what he knew of the incident to his superiors,
including the athletic director and, later, the university vice president of finance and business, who
oversaw the university police. Paterno said that he
was not accustomed to handling such situations and
was satisfied that he had adequately acted to report
the allegations made about his former employee.
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Surely, his hierarchy and their legal staff would
understand what to do under such strange circumstances.
Few people would argue that Paterno was not
only a hard-working and successful coach but that he
also had an enviable and successful family life.
However, in an unprecedented situation, success
worked against him, and a betrayal of one of his
trusted staff was surely unparalleled. He always did
what he thought was right, and he was often successful. In the alleged sexual assault cases, he also
did what he thought was right: report it to the
authorities, thinking they will take care of it.
There’s nothing at all illogical about that; after
all, Sandusky no longer worked for him.
In his last interview ever, with Sally Jenkins
(2012) of The Washington Post, some of Paterno’s
actions could be better understood: ‘‘I didn’t know
exactly how to handle it, and I was afraid to do
something that might jeopardize what the university procedure was,’’ he said. ‘‘So I backed away and
turned it over to some other people, people I
thought would have a little more expertise than I
did. It didn’t work out that way.’’ He reiterated that
McQueary was unclear with him about the nature of
what he saw and added that even if McQueary had
been more graphic, he was not sure he would have
comprehended it: ‘‘You know, he [McQueary] didn’t
want to get specific,’’ Paterno said. ‘‘And to be frank
with you, I don’t know that it would have done any
good because I never heard of. . .rape and a man. So
I just did what I thought was best. I talked to people
that I thought. . .if there was a problem. . .would
[follow] up on it.’’ Paterno later remorsed, ‘‘I grieve
for the children and their families, and I pray for
their comfort and relief.’’ When asked the obvious
of why he did not do more, he replied, ‘‘I didn’t
know exactly how to handle it.’’
Academic literature is rich in examining this type
of seemingly apathetic behavior. It has revealed
people are not apathetic; they are simply befuddled
by their situation. Paterno’s words allude to his
confusion. He knew he needed to act but did not
know how. He acted according to what he understood, assuming that his superiors were better
equipped to deal with it than he. Although he
immediately reported McQueary’s allegations to
Penn State Athletic Director Tim Curley, in the
end, he wished he had acted further: ‘‘With the
benefit of hindsight, I wish I had done more,’’ said
Paterno in a November 9, 2011, interview with The
Wall Street Journal (Gay, 2012).
The court case concluded in June 2012 as many
shocking facts emerged. As early as the 1994—1995
season, Sandusky assaulted Victim 6, but it was
not until 1998 that the victim’s mother became
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suspicious after her then 11-year-old arrived home
with wet hair after showering with Sandusky. She
reported the incident to university police, who,
along with Jerry Lauro from the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, interviewed Sandusky.
Though Sandusky admitted wrongdoing to both the
public officials and the boy’s mother, there were no
criminal charges.
In the fall of 2000, another adult bore witness to
child abuse. James Calhoun, a temporary custodian
saw Sandusky performing oral sex on a boy. The boy
was reported to be between the age of 11 and 13 and
later became known as Victim 8. Calhoun immediately reported the incident to his supervisor, who
asked him to report it to another official. Calhoun
left his job without making another report. One of
Calhoun’s co-workers, Ronald Petrosky, witnessed a
similar incident but did not report it. Paterno fired
Sandusky from his staff in June 1999, but Sandusky,
with emeritus status, still had access to the Penn
State locker room, which made his chain of command unclear.
It was not until March 1, 2002, that Mike
McQueary, a graduate assistant who would become
central to the case as the only whistleblower,
witnessed Sandusky sexually abusing a pre-teen
boy, later known as Victim 10. McQueary spoke
with his father that evening and then reported the
incident to Coach Joe Paterno the following day.
On March 3, Paterno reported what he heard to
Athletic Director Tim Curley. Later that month,
McQueary was called to meet with Curley and
Senior Vice President for Finance and Business Gary
Schultz, who had the university police under his
charge (Kingkade, 2011). Curley and Schultz assured McQueary that they would investigate his
allegations. Before the month was out, Curley
assured McQueary that Sandusky’s locker room
privileges had been revoked.
As the case unfolded, details emerged, and they
will continue to surface over the next few years. Were
there other players who did not act at all? What is
known for certain is that there were numerous counts
of inaction at many levels of responsibility. Those who
are known to have not acted responsibly have been
dismissed, including the university president. No two
levels of inaction are alike, and the combinations are
nearly infinite. For simplicity, they have been consolidated into four levels:

 Stage I. Player inaction is the failure of an organizational actor (i.e., the player) to intervene in
a situation in which he/she could prevent it
from deteriorating further. The player observes
a situation calling for action and simply does
nothing.
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Figure 1.
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Stages of Inaction

Effort
required to
correct the
situation
increases

Seeing but
not acting

Seeing and
reporting but
taking no further
action

Seeing,
reporting, and
knowing that the
situation is
deteriorating but
not acting on it;
assuming others
have acted but
not verifying

Seeing, reporting,
and knowing the
situation is
deteriorating to
the point of
danger; knowing
nothing is being
done but not
acting or verifying

STAGE I >>>>>>>>>> STAGE II >>>>>>>>>> STAGE III >>>>>>>>>> STAGE IV
Situation degrades over time

 Stage II. The player may say something or report
the incident, but his/her actions are ultimately
ineffective.

 Stage III. The player fails to ensure adequate
action is taken once the player has spoken up.
In this stage, the player may well act but fails to
follow through and does not ensure that anything
is rectified.

 Stage IV. The player has acted and is cognizant of
the situation degrading. The player may have
spoken up and followed up but not effectively,
and the situation deteriorates as the player
stands by dumbfounded.
Figure 1 depicts the four stages and diagrams the
required increased commitment to the situation as
time moves forward. When players choose to ignore
a situation, it becomes more difficult to act as time
goes on. They become committed to their original
course of inaction and flow with the situation’s
momentum as it degrades.
According to the theories of commitment and
consistency (Cialdini, 2009), organizational actors
who find themselves in Stage I and remain passive
will continue to remain passive, not wanting to go
against their original choice. It is impossible to tell
how many people were stuck in Stage I because, by
definition, they did nothing. Did other people witness abuse? In a locker room full of activity, it is hard
to imagine that they did not. Did parents ignore the
signs of abuse? There were more than 50 incidents,
but to date, only one was reported by a concerned
mother.

2.1. Sensemaking: What went wrong?
As early as 1998, Pennsylvania public officials–—
charged with the safety of its citizens–—became
stuck in Stage II. Although they were aware of child
abuse, they did not act effectively. Simply put,
releasing the perpetrator without criminal charges
was wrong. As a result of their inaction, many other
boys would be abused over the next decade. Further, unprecedented, ambiguous, misunderstood,
unclear, and obfuscated, Paterno knew there was
wrongdoing that had taken place on his watch,
reported it to the authorities, and believed his
actions were adequate. Clearly, Paterno knew he
had to do something about what he knew, so he
reported it to his chain of command–—speaking up,
Stage II. However, he was caught in Stage III, and his
failure to follow up eventually cost him his job and
reputation. It is still unknown if Paterno knew about
other incidents. Cognizant or not, it was surely his
business to know of illegal and immoral activity in
his locker room. McQueary, it seems, was stuck in
Stage IV. He spoke up and followed through. He was
led to believe that the situation was under control,
but he was not privy to the details. Perhaps he
wondered why the police never questioned him in
2002.
The public was confused. Here stood the legendary Joe Paterno, a gentleman whose actions over a
lifetime reflected high standards and ethics. He
devoted his life to taking care of, nurturing, coaching, and teaching some of the nation’s finest youth.
How was it that he did not properly handle this
situation? He was outspoken, so speaking up and
following up should not have been difficult. Even
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more, public confusion ensued after his death in
January 2012. How does one grieve during such
confusion? One needs only to hop on blog sites to
see Paterno’s defenders and persecutors lob sharp
attacks back and forth. Paterno’s 62 years at Penn
State are and probably forever will be tainted by this
incident. Already, plans to rename Beaver Stadium
at Penn State after Paterno have been canceled. He
had also been nominated for the Presidential Medal
of Freedom, but the nomination has since been
withdrawn.
Child abuse stands little tolerance in civilized
society. In his writings on sensemaking, Karl Weick
(1995) notes that child abuse has always been difficult to recognize, and in the 20th century went
ignored for many decades. One explanation for this
vacuum was lack of communication between caregivers. Another, however, is much more profound.
Adults are supposed to take care of children–—that is
simply an axiom of the human species’ survival. This
being the case, it becomes almost impossible to
believe that any parent, guardian, teacher, or coach
would behave in a manner so inconsistent with their
task. For example, Weick found that when doctors
were presented with evidence that might lead them
to believe a child had been abused by an adult, they
tended to dismiss it. So, in trying to make sense of
such a confusing, strange situation, people sought
alternate explanations. Mrs. Suzanne Paterno, the
late coach’s wife, told The Washington Post, ‘‘We
are going to become a more aware society. Maybe
we will look for clues.’’ She wonders what signs she
missed all those years when they felt so successful
and sure of themselves. ‘‘I had no clue,’’ she said. ‘‘I
thought doctors looked for child abuse in a hospital,
in a bruise or something’’ (Jenkins, 2012).
At the end of the day, Joe Paterno, several other
officials, and the university president were fired. All
the good work they had done over dozens of years
was well known, but they were dismissed because
they were perceived to have tolerated child abuse.
Sandusky, denies the allegations, and the investigation goes on. The tragedy lies in the fact that so
much irreversible damage has been done, and healing will be some time coming for the children, for
their families, and for Penn State. Many people
knew, but action was inadequate.

3. Gregarious humans: Success by
cooperation
In order to accomplish great tasks (and even small
ones), as humans, we optimize by working together.
We are a gregarious species. In one way or another,
we are all a part of one or several organizations,
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each of us spinning as a critical gear in an endless
system of systems. It follows, then, that we need to
coordinate with as well as protect our brothers and
sisters of the human race. This is how we evolved to
be the planet’s most successful species. It was
certainly not our brawn as we are out-muscled by
countless life forms. It is our ability to cooperate.
Indeed, we compete and cooperate symbiotically as
teams work with and against each other. As such,
knowing our roles in organizations is vital. We constantly balance, deciding when to act and when to
sit still, when to speak up and when to listen, when
to interfere and when to go with the flow. We do the
best we can, but we are not perfect, and we are
subject to our limited human intellect as well as
learned behaviors from our past successes and
failures.
People in large, high-powered organizations who
have complicated jobs need to optimize their time
and often take shortcuts. ‘Did this work before?
Then let’s do it that way again.’ Managers also
entrust others with complex tasks. Herbert Simon
(1997) calls this satisfycing, a behavior that is necessary in large, complex organizations because managers do not have time or resources to be cognizant
of every facet of their charge.
Joe Paterno lived a full, hectic, intense, and busy
life. His staff members numbered in the dozens, and
his players numbered more than a hundred. He was
accustomed to delegating tasks, and he needed to
trust his staff as it would not have been possible for
him to perform each task required to run a team.
Rod Kramer (2009) reminds us that sometimes we
trust too much. He asserts that we should trust
carefully, periodically verifying what we think we
know. In addition, organizations base many of their
decisions on experiential learning. Although basing
decisions on past experience can be an easy way to
proceed, it is not always effective as environments
are often dissimilar to those faced by predecessors
(March & Levinthal, 1999). Simply stated, because a
method worked in the past, does not mean it will
work in the present or the future. However, past
practices represent organizational precedent, and
going against organizational precedent requires
overcoming organizational momentum. In such
cases, it is usually risky to speak up and buck the
status quo. As a result, organizational actors will
often err on the side of the status quo and simply do
nothing. Coach Paterno was anything but average.
Few people have careers that last 62 years and work
well into their 80s. In his later years, Paterno took a
more hands-off approach to coaching. Often due to
injuries, he would coach from the press box but
would remain in constant communication with his
trusted staff on the field. His trust in his staff had
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always worked well for him, so continuing this
practice made perfect sense. Paterno selected his
staff carefully and deemed them trustworthy.

3.1. Frustration and fear
Hardly anything is more frustrating than helplessly
watching tragedy unfold. Ordinary events, such as
watching someone trip and fall, seeing a loved one
become addicted, witnessing a car accident, or
extraordinary once-in-a lifetime events, such as
living through the eruption of Mt. St. Helens, the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, or the recent tsunami in
Japan, can fill us with angst. As bystanders, we can
only watch small and helpless–—sometimes in fear
and fascination–—unable to change the course. However, what about times when we are able to prevent
or divert disaster, but we stand by gawking instead
of acting?
This topic came to the fore of social psychology in
the wake of the 1964 Kitty Genovese murder, when
33 onlookers watched for some 30 minutes but
failed to act as a woman was murdered. Rumblings
emerged that cities were becoming places where
people, cold and cruel, no longer cared about their
fellow human beings. Psychologists John Darley and
Bibb Latané were skeptical. Could people really
have become that depraved? Darley and Latané
set out to collect data on this topic and performed
experiments under varying conditions. Their findings were telling. Among a group, people tended to
behave like those around them, often believing that
their actions were appropriate or that others quite
probably knew more. Furthermore, the more ambiguous the situation, the less the group or any
single member tended to react. The theory of bystander apathy has been well supported by related
studies before and after their work (Darley &
Latané, 1968). Studies since then have told us that
people do not act because they are confused in
unknown or unique circumstances, although apathy
is not totally absent from the equation. In unprecedented situations, we are usually bewildered and
thus passive.

3.2. Altering the course: The benefit of
hindsight
It can be disconcerting to listen to academics prattle
on about the optimal path of action with the benefit
of hindsight. Without question, knowing what should
have been done is much easier than knowing what
should be done. However, by carefully examining
past situations, studies can draw from scenarios,
gleaning commonalities that could be useful in preventing similar errors. While tragedy often happens
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in differing environments, it is useful to try to learn
from our past. In distilling data, patterns may appear that can be an alert to such behavior in the
future, potentially preventing disaster or at least
mitigating risk. By nature, our lives are full of risk,
so risk mitigation is a necessary part of our successful existence. In the next scenario, an unprecedented, ambiguous, misunderstood, unclear, and
obfuscated sporting event resulted in the death of
a young man.

4. Nodar Kumaritashvili
On February 12, 2010, just hours before the opening
ceremony of the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in
Vancouver Canada, Georgian Olympic luge racer
Nodar Kumaritashvili was on a practice run and flew
off the high-speed track into a structural pole and to
his death. Hearts poured out to his grieving family
for the loss of their young son, but many agreed it
was an unavoidable tragedy bound to happen in such
an inherently dangerous sport. Meanwhile, the
events that led up to it revealed something much
different.

4.1. Slow slippage to tragedy
Backtracking to examine how this event transpired
exposes decisions long before the track was built.
These dubious decisions affected what would culminate in an exceedingly fast track. The track was
designed for speeds of up to 90 miles per hour, but
prior to the Olympic Games, the final top-speed
estimate was 106. As with chaos theory’s notion
of sensitivity to initial conditions, where a single
decision or small change in the beginning can have
enormous effects later, this disaster was born several years before the event (Gleick, 2008). The luge
site selection would prove instrumental in a series of
decisions that followed. Although the track was
originally slated to be built near Vancouver, the
Vancouver Olympic Organizing Committee (VANOC)
was concerned that a track near the city and coast
would be warmer and could become slushy and slow.
They selected a narrower and steeper area north of
Vancouver in the Whistler Resort area where the
weather was consistently colder. Further north,
the Olympians, would be guaranteed hard, fast
ice. The site dictated narrow, steep, sharp turns,
meaning the outcome would be the world’s fastest
track, which would likely be the venue for record
speeds for the luge, bobsled, and other sliding
events. To the planners, this promised recordbreaking speeds during the Olympic Games and a
track that would attract extreme sports enthusiasts
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from around the globe for many years to come. To
the city, an extreme track guaranteed more tourists
and financial prosperity far into the future.
Prior to selecting the site, the vice president of
the Olympic organizing committee consulted with
the International Luge Federation and International
Bobsleigh and Tobogganing and considered several
possibilities. They consulted a bobsledding expert
and former member of Canada’s Bobsled Federation, who initially liked the narrower, steeper location but later noted that the site was not ideal. ‘‘It
would have been nicer if the site would have been
wider,’’ he said. Initial concepts were sent to a
world-renowned track designer in Germany. The
71-year-old was steeped in experience, having built
most of the world’s modern bobsled and luge tracks.
The track opened for testing in March 2008. During
two years of testing, world-class lugers also expressed concern over dangerously high speeds. An
Austrian luger noted, ‘‘If you start having problems
there was nothing you could do [to make corrections] because of the speed.’’ A Polish luger echoed
these comments: ‘‘It was crazy fast’’ (Crawford,
Albergotti, & Johnson, 2010).
Nodar Kumaritashvili joined his fellow Olympians
for the pre-game test runs. After his death, a new
wall and other safety features were added to the
track to prevent a recurrence. VANOC gave the
family s10,000 as a small token of their sorrow,
but nothing would ever reconcile the young Olympian’s untimely death. The family buried him February 20, 2010, before the close of the Vancouver
Winter Olympic Games.

4.2. Inherently dangerous, but safe?
Who is to blame? Shouldn’t someone or at least an
organization be held accountable for this tragedy?
Warning signals and red flags popped up everywhere
prior to the track’s completion and even during the
two years of testing. While many people and organizations expressed concerns about safety, no one
acted effectively. Why? Various people commented
on the extreme speed, including the designer, who
did not expect the test speeds to exceed 90 miles per
hour. Many organizations, experts, and designers had
serious concerns about the track but never actually
verbalized them until it was too late. Stuck in Stage I
of inaction, the players did not know how to revert to
a more suitable design. There had not yet been any
fatalities on their watch, so as with Paterno, past
success was once again working against them.
Psychologist Bob Cialdini (2009) says that humans
have developed fixed-action patterns. We have
evolved this way to be efficient–—able to take mental shortcuts–—and not have to continually relearn
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and reevaluate our plan in similar situations. The
behavior he calls social proof is common. Responsibility for this track was spread quite literally around
the globe, and accountability was obfuscated. Integral players in the Whistler Sliding Center were
warned, but no single organizational player could
effectively be the whistleblower. Studies have also
suggested that the larger the group, the less likely
one is to speak out.
In the design and building of the Whistler Sliding
Center, several organizations were responsible for
the track design and construction. Communications
bounced back and forth for years between these
organizations and people scattered around the
globe. Language differences and distances confounded communications. The speeds and turns at
the Whistler Sliding Center were unprecedented,
and where unprecedented activities lurk, so does
confusion. When technologies step outside known
and comfortable boundaries, people find it impossible to predict outcomes without a standard of comparison. Events unfold and organizational actors
may have varying visions of what is to come. As with
social proof, people and organizations assume that
with so many experts overseeing the process, surely someone would speak up if danger beyond the
norm was impending. However, under the momentum of the situation, it would be nearly impossible
to stop and reassess. While some of the organizational players occasionally expressed concern,
stuck in Stage II, they did not act effectively. As
early as March 2009, an attorney for VANOC said
that given the warnings, should someone get injured, the case could be made that the committee
was warned and did nothing. He also commented
that with the Olympics just a year away, he was not
sure there was any option to rebuild the track
(Dowd, 2012). One could easily speculate it was
in the best interest of several entities to keep the
track’s speeds at a record-breaking level. With all
the wrong incentives working against them, the
organizational players continued to move in the
same direction. This could explain why, in the wake
of Kumaritashvili’s death, even after adding a wall
and some padding, VANOC insisted that the track
was safe and that no one had been seriously injured
on it in two years of testing. Safe? What does safe
mean? Is a luge run ever safe? A world-class luger
had just died on their track, and they deemed it
safe. As any risk analyst will tell you, the term safe
is relative.
So if the track was safe, then why, after Nodar
Kumaritashvili’s death, did they add an additional
wall and padding? Why was the starting point moved
lower on the track? More importantly, why weren’t
these changes made before the Olympics rather than
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after Kumaritashvili’s death? The committee–—
perhaps unwittingly–—was playing a little game of
risk. Since there had been no deaths in the two years
of testing, it would have been difficult to justify track
changes. Further, had someone spoken up to suggest
changes, it might have been perceived as an admission that the track was not up to Olympic safety
standards. Stated or not, VANOC also was motivated
to claim the fastest track in history. As it turns out,
many people did speak up but not to the point that
any effective changes were made.
Like so many other winter sports, luge it is inherently dangerous. With the Whistler Sliding Center,
the sport was going through a radical change as the
speed increased by an order of magnitude. Further,
VANOC’s commitment to making the track notoriously fast in order to draw tourists did not keep with
the needs of the Olympics.

garnered from a history of making mistakes. When
people are faced with ambivalent circumstances,
they swing with the momentum. Remember from
physics that momentum has both mass and direction.
With unprecedented track speeds and non-negotiable time pressure, it would have been difficult to
alter either one.
For highly complicated projects requiring high
specialization, this is a necessary condition and
not necessarily a bad one, but it can cause problems. Darley and Latané (1968) found that the more
people were involved in observing a situation, the
less likely they were to act with sound judgment as
accountability was diffused among various groups
and, with the groups, various people. So the various
experts involved watched the situation degrade
until they were forced to make a change.

4.3. Following the crowd

5. Can human nature change?

I am by no means suggesting that the people involved
in creating one of the world’s most magnificent sports
complexes are incompetent, evil, or sinister. By most
measures, the work they did was superb. It is not
weird or unusual to expect such a sport to advance as
nearly all other sports have (e.g., more advanced
equipment as the result of better technology). The
cutting edge is part of Olympic-level sports. The
many committees, directors, inspectors, and planners were part of a system of checks and balances
that often worked well. In fact, they followed a host
of safety regulations that were added to the specifications as a result of collective organizational
knowledge accumulated over hundreds of years of
sledding. This was the fastest and newest track to
date, but taking the luge to the next level would
require foresight into circumstances yet unknown.
While many people involved in planning alluded to
concerns about extreme speeds and indicated at
least some skepticism, they ultimately went along
with the plans. What would have happened if someone had raised a red flag insisting on a reexamination?
One can only speculate. VANOC was under nonnegotiable time pressure to have the Whistler Sliding
Center ready before the 2010 Winter Olympics. The
Olympic dates were not going to change, and it had to
be ready. As it was, several people and organizations
expressed worries, but construction continued according to plans. For an organizational player it
would have been highly risky behavior to stand
out. People are not rewarded for preventing accidents as it is impossible to know what disaster might
have been averted. The formal system of checks and
balances in most large organizations usually evolves
as result of learned behaviors and applied knowledge

Going along with others is a behavior resulting from
more than two million years of human evolution, for
which it has been largely successful. Most of us do it
most of the time. The scenarios discussed both beg
the question: can human nature change? We seem to
know what we have done wrong, but implementing
meaningful change is not always possible. Pfeffer
and Sutton (1999) suggest that much of our nature
prevents us from being capable of lasting implementation. Their studies have shown that many of us
exist in a knowing-doing gap: we know what the
right course is but fail to follow it. Will we always be
afraid to speak against the status quo in large
groups? What about those who do? Going against
superiors’ opinions is usually career-ending. More
specific phenomena that perturb good judgment are
unprecedented situations and communications confusion, which are discussed next.

5.1. Unprecedented situation = Confusion
As discussed earlier, human beings not only rely on
each other but on past experience. We take shortcuts so that each time we encounter a situation, we
do not have to waste time reevaluating what to do.
Most of what we do every day is repetitive, so we do
not need to relearn common behaviors. However,
when a situation has no precedent, we have to think
and decide. We may try to learn through others’
experience by watching them, but even situations
with precedent often occur in new environments.
For most situations, experience is an excellent
teacher, but for others, it is not. In ambiguous
situations, we have difficulty deciding how to react
or behave. We are befuddled and confused. It should
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be noted that at the end of the 1999 football season,
Paterno dismissed Sandusky reportedly for poor performance as a coach. It is curious to wonder whether
Paterno’s keen sense smelled something wrong.
Perhaps he actually did not feel that Sandusky could
not be trusted.

5.2. Shooting the messenger
Another strange phenomenon that likely affects
player inaction is the mum effect. That is, organizational actors tend to dilute bad news up the chain
of command because no one wants to give the boss
bad news. The bearer of the news will likely be
blamed regardless of fault. As a result, communications weaken up the chain of command and
higher-ups tend to be blind to potentially important
information in their organization. Closer to home,
readers may recall a childhood incident. Our first
thought was ‘Who is going to tell Mom?’ As children,
we knew instinctively that whoever told Mom would
be on the receiving end of her wrath, so the common
tactic was to simply avoid telling her. Literature
shows that shooting the messenger has been deeply
engrained in the human psyche, and behavior in
modern organizations has revealed this as well.
The mum effect results from the messenger making
bad news sound not so bad, or worse, not delivering
it at all (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006). In turn, this causes
a roadblock to communication, which can have dire
consequences. In the case of Penn State, McQueary
was able to rise above his situation. Undoubtedly, it
was difficult for him to report what he saw and must
have required some fortitude on his part. No one
wants to deliver bad news.

5.3. Moving forward
Is player inaction a fatal, unchangeable human flaw?
If so, how can we possibly move forward? Are we
forever subject to the effects inherent in our organizations? How can we learn from history when no
two situations or environments are alike? Professor
Jim March says that we in fact can learn from history
and further that we must (March, Sproull, & Tamuz
1999). History, he observes, is not always generous
with experience, and sample size can be meager.
Since ambiguous situations foster mimetic actions,
unprecedented situations can create complete confusion. These are dangerous cases in which people
are most likely not to speak up but, paradoxically,
are when their input is most needed. Risky behavior
prevails in many organizations, and even if the tasks
are different and the organizations look different,
human and organizational misbehavior can and will
continue if society does not learn from the past. In
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order to change this type of culture, mangers will
have to consider the following:

 Hold people accountable, including yourself. This
is the age-old issue of where the buck stops.
Groups and individuals need to be held accountable for their decisions and actions. Ensure your
subordinates know the tasks for which they are
responsible and then give them the authority to
act appropriately. Additionally, ensure they know
that they have your support when they fail and
that they are comfortable fessing up.

 Do not shoot the messenger. We all do it, and it is
the best way to shut down critical communication. Vital information that you need to know lies
on the floor of your organization. Your hands-on
workers are your best source of data, but they
possibly see their input as a criticism of the
organization or their hierarchy–—the very people
who evaluate them. Provide them channels
through which to speak up without fear.

 Keep clear and open communication. High communication is essential. While a subordinate should
ideally communicate through his/her chain of
command, it should not be a hard requirement.
There are times when players will have to communicate outside their divisions, and requiring that
they ‘go through channels’ can be hazardous by
muddling the message. It can also waste time. With
the trend of organizations becoming flatter, channels of communication do not always exist, and
organizational players need to communicate
through informal channels (Pfeffer, 2010).

 Respect all ideas. If you are fortunate enough to
get candid input from your colleagues and subordinates, consider and respect their ideas. Regardless of whether or not you believe the idea has
merit, remember that it was given to you at great
risk, and the colleague or subordinate who delivered it had to muster up a lot of courage to come to
you. If your initial reaction is to dismiss it, reconsider. The late Roger Boisjoly was one of the few Oring engineers to speak out against launching Space
Shuttle Challenger that cold, wet morning in Florida in January 1986, but his input was not respected. Had his hierarchy taken the time to
carefully consider his technical knowledge and
opinion, disaster could have been averted.

 Encourage whistleblowers. Keep posing questions
to anyone and everyone. This will often require
drawing information out of people like parents
do out of teenagers who are not always 100%
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forthcoming. Insist on recommendations from everyone. If you think you may get more information
by allowing anonymous input, consider that. Perhaps a secret ballot among VANOC and their partners would have revealed that many people had
similar concerns about the track. Secret input is a
common tactic to encourage whistleblowing so
organizational actors do not fear losing their jobs.

 Listen to your stomach. If something does not
seem right, human beings feel it in the gut first.
This is not just an expression but an actual physiological reaction to a situation that for some reason
seems askew. For example, many humans fear both
poisonous and non-poisonous spiders. This irrational behavior is the result of our ancestors who
survived by staying away from poisonous spiders.
Since it is not often easy to distinguish a poisonous
from a harmless spider, our default reaction is to
fear all of them. When arachnophobics see a spider, they feel fear in the gut first. Our brain may
tell us it is harmless, but it is still nearly impossible
to overcome panic. Similarly, organizational players may observe something that does not sit right in
their stomachs but is difficult to verbalize.

 Be proactive, not reactive. Encourage those
around you to act by being proactive yourself.
Always consider best- and worst-case scenarios.
If possible, perform quantitative and qualitative
risk analysis.

 Alleviate time pressure. There will always be
deadlines and pressure to act quickly, but mindfulness that many deadlines are not real is important. Some are merely selected arbitrarily or at a
time previously set for a schedule that is no longer
relevant, perhaps without knowledge of what
might transpire. Nonetheless, effective managers
do not give the impression of panic or have a
hurried disposition.

6. Abundantly human
Sports have become big business even at the amateur
level. Similar passive behavior is not uncommon
among business and government. Countless tragic
events over the past 10 years could have been
averted had input been forthcoming and seriously
considered.

6.1. Crisis management
One such area of research is in the aircraft industry.
Now termed captainitis, the tendency for cockpit
crew members to not challenge the pilot has been in
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play in countless aircraft accidents. Captainitis was
largely blamed for the deadliest airline crash in
history when two 747s collided on the small island
of Tenerife in 1977, killing 583 people. While there
were numerous factors present, the KLM captain
ignored his first officer’s reminders that they did
not have clearance for takeoff. The captain started
down the runway in heavy fog and broadsided the Pan
Am 747 that was still on the runway (Weick, 1990).
Another infamous case was the 1982 Air Florida
crash into Washington D.C.’s 14th Street Bridge. It
was a snowy day in the D.C. area, and the Air Florida
737 was being de-iced in preparation for takeoff
from National Airport. Ice on aircraft wings has an
adverse effect on lift and speed. As the aircraft was
rolling down the runway, the first officer told the
captain three times that the speed did not seem
right, but the captain dismissed him. The 737 indeed
lacked adequate lift, hit the 14th Street Bridge,
crashing into the Potomac River and killing nearly
everyone on board (Kayten, 1993). There are countless other accounts of accidents in which players
were intimidated by the boss and did not ensure
their input was taken seriously. The Air Force and
commercial airlines have studied captainitis extensively, and there are even training seminars tasked
to teach copilots how to speak up and captains how
to better encourage input and listen.
In recent disasters, such as the Costa Concordia
sinking and the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion,
one cannot help but wonder if crew members had
insight into what was about to happen; perhaps
they even spoke up but were not heard. These
cases are ongoing, but better crisis management
was clearly needed in each of the aforementioned
situations.

7. Conclusion
Surely, we are all abundantly human, and organizations are resilient to cultural change. Who could have
believed that in the highly respected Penn State
football program, there could be wrongdoing as bizarre as child abuse? This is an organization that exists
for the wellbeing of young people. As well, in inherently dangerous sports, such as luging, there will
surely be accidents in the future, some perhaps that
should have been prevented. Pushing the outer envelope is a part of who we are. We compete in athletic
and all kinds of other events, risking life and limb
because we are driven by nature. In our innate drive,
however, we are inclined to overlook obvious dangers
for all the reasons outlined here. To overcome irrational behavior, we need to step back, take a breath,
think rationally, and–—most importantly–—have the
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patience to listen to others as well as the courage to
speak up.
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